Case Study

Case Study: Ransomware Recovery Using Encrypted Cloud Backup for a US Manufacturer

Ransomware Recovery Using Encrypted Cloud Backups - Case Study

A case study on how a US manufacturer used ransomware recovery planning, encrypted cloud backup, and disciplined backup and disaster recovery testing to restore operations without paying.

Executive Summary

This case study follows a mid-sized US manufacturing company that was hit by ransomware on a Monday morning, lost access to shared production documents, and faced immediate pressure to pay. The company did not win because it had a bigger security budget. It won because it had disciplined recovery readiness.

They implemented an encrypted cloud backup approach using RedVault Systems, encrypting data before it was sent to Backblaze B2, then built a recovery program around routine restore testing and a practical recovery runbook.

When ransomware hit, they restored critical operational data in a controlled sequence, kept production moving using temporary workarounds, and avoided ransom payment. The incident still hurt, but it did not become a prolonged shutdown.

This case study covers how they prepared, what happened during the incident, how recovery was executed, and what they changed afterward.

Organization Profile

The organization was a US manufacturer supplying components to industrial customers. They were not a global enterprise. They were a realistic mid-market company with a small IT team, lean operations, and high dependence on consistent access to production documentation.

Key characteristics:

What data mattered most

For manufacturing, downtime does not only affect email. It affects physical production.

The most critical data categories included:

A ransomware event that encrypts shared folders hits the company where it hurts most: production continuity.

The Starting Point

Before improving their program, the company's backup strategy looked like what many mid-market manufacturers rely on:

They also had a common belief:

If we have backups, we can recover.

The issue was that "having backups" is not a plan unless you know:

They did not have that discipline.

What Forced Action

Two triggers pushed the company to take recovery seriously.

Trigger 1: Customer pressure

A large customer asked them to prove operational resilience after a supplier in the same sector had a ransomware shutdown. The customer wanted confidence that production would not stop for a week if something happened.

That forced a hard internal conversation:

Could we prove we can recover?

Trigger 2: A near-miss

They had a near-miss event where a workstation infection was contained early, but it revealed weak spots:

Leadership finally gave the IT team what they needed:

Time and budget to build recovery discipline properly.

Requirements for the New Recovery Program

They wrote a clear set of requirements based on reality, not marketing.

Security and resilience requirements:

Operational requirements:

They also set a simple rule:

If we cannot restore quickly, we will feel pressured to pay. Recovery must remove that pressure.

Why They Selected RedVault

They chose RedVault because it aligned with the encryption-first model and because it fit their operational reality.

They wanted a story leadership could understand:

Backups are encrypted before upload and keys are controlled by us.

They also wanted a clean operational approach:

Backups run consistently, recovery is predictable, and restore testing can be documented.

They were not chasing a certificate. They were building a recovery engine.

Implementation

They implemented the new program in phases.

Phase 1: Business impact inventory

They mapped what "must come back first" during a ransomware event.

They categorized data into three tiers:

Tier 1: Production-critical

Tier 2: Business continuity

Tier 3: Administrative

This tiering later became the recovery sequence during the incident.

Phase 2: Backup scope and key handling discipline

They standardized backup coverage across:

They also created a key handling policy because encryption is only helpful when keys are protected and usable.

Their key handling policy included:

This reduced a risk many companies ignore:

Key loss during a crisis.

Phase 3: Restore testing and runbook creation

They created a recovery runbook with:

Then they tested it.

Their restore testing discipline included:

They built confidence, and they also built predictability.

The Incident

The ransomware incident occurred six months after their improved recovery program was put in place.

Day 1: First signs

Monday, 7:12 AM. Multiple users reported shared folders were "not opening." A production supervisor noticed that a work instruction file had a strange extension. Within minutes, a few machines displayed a ransom note.

The IT team recognized it quickly:

This was not a single infected workstation. This was shared folder encryption activity.

They initiated incident response and escalated to leadership.

Containment

They executed containment rapidly:

They also informed operations leadership:

Production documentation access will be limited while we contain and restore.

This is where manufacturing differs from office environments. You cannot simply tell people to wait. You must keep production moving.

Keeping production moving during recovery

The company used temporary workarounds:

These workarounds did not replace full digital access, but they prevented a total stop.

Recovery Decisions

Leadership asked the question that always comes:

Should we pay?

The IT lead gave a calm answer:

We have tested restores for the critical shares. We can restore Tier 1 documentation first. We will not pay unless restoration fails.

That answer mattered. It made ransom payment a last resort rather than a panic decision.

Recovery Execution

They restored in a strict sequence.

Priority 1: Production-critical documentation

They restored:

They focused on the minimum set needed to keep production running.

They selected restore points carefully to avoid restoring data that could be reinfected.

By early afternoon, production teams had access to the most critical documentation again.

Priority 2: Shipping and logistics

Next, they restored shipping forms and logistics documentation because same-day deliveries were contractually important.

Priority 3: Purchasing and finance exports

They restored purchasing and inventory exports next to stabilize supply chain workflows.

Validation steps

They validated restorations using a checklist:

This validation prevented a common recovery failure:

Restoring incomplete or corrupted data and discovering it later.

Outcome

The manufacturer avoided the worst-case scenario.

They achieved:

The incident still cost them time and stress. But it did not become a multi-week shutdown.

What They Changed After the Incident

They made practical improvements based on what the incident revealed.

Better identity controls

They tightened authentication and reduced over-permissioned accounts.

Stronger segmentation

They segmented certain file shares to reduce spread potential.

More frequent recovery drills

They increased restore test cadence for Tier 1 documentation and improved runbook clarity.

Vendor access tightening

They reviewed third-party remote access policies and improved monitoring.

Key Takeaways

If you depend on shared folders for production, ransomware is not an IT issue. It is an operations issue.

A strong recovery posture is built on:

References

← Back to All Case Studies